Landmark Cases Under POCSO Act, 2012

Attorney General of India v. Satish and another 2021/INSC/762

Under the pretence of giving guava, a 40-year-old man took a 12-year-old girl to his house, where he then grabbed her breast, tried to pull off her clothes, and locked her in a room. The mother of the victim served as the case’s informant. Sections 342, 354 and 363 of The Indian Penal Code,1860 (IPC), as well as Section 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO), were utilized by the Special Court to convict and punish the accused. The accused appealed the ruling in question to the Bombay High Court.

The Bombay High Court held that this incident only constitutes “Insulting Modesty of Woman” under the IPC because there was no skin-to-skin contact and no “sexual assault” as defined by the POCSO Act. In addition, imprisonment was cut from three years to one year. The Attorney General of India, the National Commission for Women, the State of Maharashtra, and the appellant filed four appeals before the Supreme Court against the order passed by the Bombay High Court. The Supreme Court set aside the order passed by the Bombay High Court stating that skin-to-skin contact is not an essential element for sexual assault under Section 7 of the POCSO Act; instead, it is “sexual intent” and the culpable mental state of the accused under Section 30 of the POCSO Act was proved by the prosecution. Therefore, the accused was ordered to serve three years of rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.500/-, and a separate sentence was imposed for the other offences under the IPC as the accused was sentenced for the significant offence under Section 8 of the POCSO Act.

Alakh Alok Srivastava Vs Union of India And Others (2018) 17 SCC 291

In this case, the Supreme Court laid down guidelines for the High Courts and Special Courts while trying a case under the POCSO ACT.

  1. The High Courts shall be responsible for making sure that Special Courts are used to hear cases brought under the POCSO Act and that those courts’ judges have received training in child protection and psychological reactions.
  2. Special courts should be established so the trial can be finished promptly or within the limit specified under the Act.
  3. The Special Courts should be instructed to expedite the cases by not granting unnecessary adjournments.
  4. A three-judge committee will be established by the Chief Justices of the High Courts to oversee and monitor the POCSO Act trials.
  5. When three judges are needed for the High Courts, the Chief Justices of those courts will appoint a single judge committee.
  6. To make sure that the investigation is carried out effectively and that witnesses are produced on the dates set before the trial courts, the Director General of Police or a State authority of comparable status must form a Special Task Force.
  7. Special Courts to ensure that the POCSO Act’s spirit is respected while considering the terms of the Act.

Balaji Sarjerao Kamble v. State of Maharashtra MANU/MH/1957/2017

The appellant was found guilty by the Special Judge under Sections 4 and 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offenses Act, 2012 (POCSO Act), as well as Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), of allegedly raping a six-year-old. He was ordered to serve a rigorous 7-year sentence for the IPC offence punishable under Section 376, along with a fine of Rs.5000. Also, he was sentenced separately to seven years and three years of rigorous imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section 4 and Section 8 of the POCSO Act, with a fine of Rs.5000 and Rs.1000 respectively. The issue on the appeal was whether the victim’s testimony could be disregarded if she could not provide the incident’s date. The Bombay High Court stated that the victim’s evidence regarding the penetrating sexual assault was deemed to be clear and convincing by the Court. Therefore, the victim’s evidence cannot be questioned just because she has not provided the date of the incident. The Court, however, observed that the appellant had been convicted twice for the same offence. Hence, the Court quashed the sentence imposed under section 376 of IPC.

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