Sexual Relations In The Promise Of Marriage- Indian Courts Crack The Whip

Marriage was once seen as a religious and social institution rather than a legal one, but as circumstances have changed, it is now regarded as a personal decision and marriage between two individuals rather than two families. Marriage unites two people for life, allowing them to pursue responsibility, possessions, and physical pleasures.

Rape is derived from the Latin phrase “rapio,” which means “seize.” Rape is defined under Section 372 of the IPC. Rape is a violation of a woman’s intimate parts and is an outrage in every way. It is considered the most serious crime since it produces immense mental and bodily suffering that might last a lifetime for the victim.

Promise to marry and have sexual relations

A person’s consent for sexual intercourse gained by a false promise of marriage does not relieve him of rape accusations. When the accused promises to marry the victim despite having no intention of marrying, and the victim gives consent for sexual intercourse based on such an assurance by the accused that he would marry her, such consent can be said to be obtained on a misconception of fact as per Section 90 of the Indian Panel Code, and, in such a case, such consent would not excuse the offender. Such an offender can be said to have committed the rape as defined under Section 375 of the Indian Panel Code and shall be punished for the same.

Section 90 of the IPC states that permission granted based on a false belief is not consent. In promise-to-marry situations, the fraudulent promise of marriage is considered a factual error. Even if the sexual encounter was consenting in itself, due to a misconception of marriage, it fits inside the rape.

Courts may classify ordinarily consenting sexual intercourse as rape if it occurs under the guise of a false promise of marriage. If it can be established that: the woman’s permission to have sexual intercourse is purely based on the man’s promise of marriage, the man had no genuine intention of marrying, and the promise of marriage was simply to elicit consent for sexual intercourse, the consent is null and void.

False promise refers to a promise that the accused had no intention of executing from the start. On the other hand, the inability to keep a commitment might occur owing to various unforeseeable causes. Courts take an entirely different stance in circumstances of incapacity to fulfil a marriage pledge.

Related Judgements

In the case of Uday v. State of Karnataka (2003) MANU/SC/0162/2003 [1], the complainant, a college student, confessed in her statement that she understood from the start that her connection with the accused would be met with severe opposition from both of their families. The Court stated that, regardless of this information, she continued to have sexual relations with the accused. In this case, the complainant’s choice to continue having sexual relations with the accused was motivated by other factors other than the accused’s promise of marriage.

In the case of Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State Of A.P (2006) MANU/SC/8531/2006 [2], the accused had sexual relations with the girl on the promise that he would marry her. When she became pregnant, the accused refused to marry her. The case was brought before the Panchayat, where the accused admitted guilt and promised to marry her, but he left the village. The Supreme Court noted that the girl clearly had sexual relations with the accused in exchange for the accused’s promise to marry her. The accused’s actions constituted rape. She would not have allowed the accused to have sexual relations if this promise had not been made; hence he was convicted to seven years of imprisonment and a fine.

The Supreme Court in Deepak Gulati v.State of Haryana (2013) MANU/SC/0546/2013 [3] ruled that an accused can be convicted of rape under the criminal provisions only if there is proof that ‘the accused’s purpose was mala fide.

The Court further stated that the complainant should have sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the accused had no intention of marrying the victim in the first place. In such a case, Section 90 of the IPC cannot be utilised to impose criminal culpability on the accused.

In Anurag Soni v. The State Of Chhattisgarh (2019) MANU/SC/0522/ [4], a young girl studying Pharmacy, unaware that the appellant’s marriage was set with another lady, consented to sexual intercourse with a doctor only after he assured her that he would marry her. The Court found that based on the evidence, the accused had no intention of marrying the prosecutor from the start, and he made a false promise to her in exchange for her consent to have sexual contact with him. Since her consent was based on a misconception of the facts under Section 90, her consent will be ruled null and void. As a result, the accused was found guilty of rape under Section 375 of the IPC and was punished for the same.

In the recent case of Naim Ahmad v. State (NCT of Delhi), MANU/SC/0080/2023 [5]. While finding the appellant-accused guilty of the offence under Section 376 of the IPC, the Sessions Court sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for ten years and a fine of Rs.50,000/-, with additional imprisonment for one year in default. The Sessions Court further ordered the appellant to give the prosecutrix compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- in order for her to support herself and the minor child.

The accused-appellant challenged the said order in the High Court, and the High Court modified the Sessions Court’s sentence order by reducing the substantive punishment to 7 years with a fine of Rs.5,000/- and confirming the direction regarding the payment of compensation.

Further, the High Court’s decision was challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court allowed the said appeal, and the orders of the Session Court and High Court were set aside, stating that “It would be wrong to consider that every breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence of rape under section 376 of IPC” and the appellant/accused was acquitted of the charges levelled against him, but the direction for the payment of compensation to the prosecutor remained unchanged.

[1]MANU/SC/0162/2003

[2]MANU/SC/8531/2006

[3]MANU/SC/0546/2013

[4]MANU/SC/0522/2019

[5]MANU/SC/0080/2023

Share:

More Posts